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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
good. Of course, the State by whose law the marriage is in-
valid can refuse to allow these parties certain privileges of the
marital relationship while the parties are within that State.*
William Swanberg.
VALIDITY OF NON-VOTING PROVISIONS IN
CORPORATE STOCK
According to the records of the Secretary of State, the device
of non-voting stock is used occasionally in Montana. This prac-
tice apparently is authorized by Section 5905, R.C.M., 1935,
which requires that the articles of incorporation set forth "the
amount of its capital stock, and the number of shares into
which it is divided, and if there is to be more than one (1)
class of stock created by the articles of incorporation, a desig-
nation of each class and the number of shares into which it
is divided, and a designation of the voting powers or rights,
if any, of any or all classes of stock, with any limitations or
restrictions thereof, * 0 • .I
However, this Section must be read in the light of the State
constitution, Article XV, See. 4, which reads: "The legislative
assembly shall provide by law that in all elections for directors
or trustees of incorporated companies, every shareholder shall
have the right to vote in person or by proxy the number of
shares of stock owned by him for as many persons as there
are directors or trustees to be elected, or to cumulate said
shares, and give one candidate as many votes as the number of
directors multiplied by the number of his shares of stock shall
equal, or to distribute them, on the same principle, among as
many candidates as he shall think fit, and such directors or
trustees shall not be elected in any other manner."'
Article XV, Sec. 4, appears to have more than one purpose.
First, it establishes the share of stock as the unit of voting
"Cross v. Cross, decided by the Montana Supreme Court March 15, 1940,
agrees in substance with the conclusions of this note, quoting from 38
C. J. 1349 to the effect that "Jurisdiction of the marriage re8 depends
upon the residence or the domicile of the plaintiff, and It Is immate-
rial where the marriage was solemnized." However, it having been
recognized earlier that annulment declares the marriage void ab initio,
this statement, although correctly stating jurisdiction for divorce, begs
the question as to annulment because the very question at issue is
whether a marriage res ever existed. But the statement is consistent
with the modern view that the domicil ultimately controls the validity
of the original marriage. Moreover, it is entirely possible that R. C.
M., 1935, Sec. 5729, which sets forth the causes for annulling marriages
operates to dissolve the marriage from the time of the decree only,
and not from the time of marriage. If this is the case, then the law
governing annulment is much the same as the law governing divorce.
'See also Art. XV, Sec. 10, which might affect Sec. 5905.
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power. Second, it grants the right of cumulative voting. But
does it have the third purpose of granting to every shareholder
the right to vote his stock as an inseparable incident thereof ?
If it does grant such a right, then it would seem that Sec. 5905
is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the issuance of stock
with no voting power.
It is possible that the framers of the constitution meant to
provide only that every shareholder entitled to vote shall have
the right to vote in the manner specified. A similar provision
in the Missouri constitution was so interpreted by the Missouri
Supreme Court in State ex rel. Frank v. Swanger.' In that
case the Court, holding that preferred stock of a corporation
may be made non-voting under a statute giving the power to
issue such stock, said, "Properly understood we think Section 6
of Art. XII means only that every shareholder entitled to vote
at any corporate election is entitled to vote his shares on the
cumulative plan, but does not mean that the stockholders them-
selves in the organization of the company may not voluntarily
agree that certain preferred stock shall be issued, and that the
holders shall not have the right to vote."
On the other hand, there is considerable authority to the
effect that such a constitutional provision grants a definite
right to each and every shareholder to vote his stock, at least in
the election of directors. Illinois has exactly the same consti-
tutional provision on the subject as has Montana,' and, in Peo-
ple ex rel. Watseka Telephone Co. v. Emerson,: the Supreme
Court of Illinois held that a corporation cannot deprive stock-
holders of the constitutional right to vote for directors and
that the Secretary of State was right in refusing to grant a
charter to a corporation which in its articles of incorporation
provided for non-voting stock. In Luthy v. Reame the Court
said that the stockholders cannot be deprived, nor can they
deprive themselves, of their constitutional power to vote for
directors. Hall v. Woods' declared that any provision of a
statute or by-law having the effect of depriving a stockholder
of the right to vote for directors is unconstitutional.
The State of Delaware had, until it was repealed in 1903,
a similar constitutional provision' which read in part, "* * * in
all elections for directors or managers of stock corporations,
each shareholder shall be entitled to one vote for each share
2Of course, even though the court were to decide that Art. XV, Sec. 4.
granted a power to every shareholder to vote in the election of direct-
ors, it might well hold that the right might be contracted away. But
see Luthy v. Ream, infra.
'190 Mo. 561, 89 S. W. 872, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 121 (1905).
"Art. XI, Sec. 3, Const. of 1870.
'302 IlL 300, 134 N. E. 707, 21 A. L R. 636 (1922).
6270 Ill. 170, 110 N. E. 373, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 368 (1915).
'325 Ill. 114, 156 N. E. 258 (1927).
$Art. IX, Sec. 6, Coast. of 1897.
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of stock he may hold * . " In Brooks v. State ex rel. Richards'
the Court held that, in the light of that Section, statutory and
charter authority to deprive holders of preferred stock of the
right to vote in the election of officers and directors is invalid.
California had until recently a similar provision in its
constitution:' and also a statute expressly giving voting rights
to all stockholders.' In Centrifugal Nat. Concentrate Co. v.
EccIeston" the Court held that the power of the Corporation
Commissioner to impose regulations to prevent fraud in stock
sales did not vest him with power to deny the owner the right
to vote all his stock. The Court, referring to Art. XII, See.
12, of the constitution, stated that "The constitution has given
the owner of the stock the right to vote it because it is he, who
is, in the last analysis, liable for the debts of the corporation
in proportion to the stock owned by him." The California
Court cited with approval People v. Emerson, supra. Evidently
those interested in making non-voting stock lawful in California
found it necessary to repeal Art. XII, See. 12, as has now been
done.u
Fletcher, in his CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS," says: "According to the weight of authority such
a provision [referring to a provision for non-voting stock] is
not in conflict with a constitutional or statutory provision to
the effect that each shareholder shall be entitled to one vote
for each share held by him, although there is authority to the
contrary." In favor of his proposition he cites State v.
Swanger, supra, and People v. Koenig." He cites Brooks v.
State, supra, as being contra, but ignores the Illinois and the
California cases. As People v. Koenig, supra, refers only to
a statutory provision, it is doubtful if his statement as to the
weight of authority is correct.
The Supreme Court of Montana has had very little to say
on the interpretation of Art. XII, Sec. 4. In Allen v. Mon-
tana Refining Co.'" the Court, in response to a contention by
counsel that a preferred stockholder should be able to vote his
stock notwithstanding contrary provision in the articles of in-
corporation, the by-laws, and the stock certificate, pointed out
that the corporation involved was a foreign corporation and
said that this constitutional provision applies only to domestic
corporations. The Court in this case referred to only the first
part of the Montana constitutional provision giving every share-
'3 Del. 1, 79 Ati. 790, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1126 (1911).
'eArt. XII, Sec. 12, Const. of 1879.
USec. 307, Calif. Civil Code, Superseded 1931.
"122 Cal. App. 698, 10 P. (2d) 1033 (1932).
"Nov. 4, 1930.
14Vol. VI, Sec. 3638, at page 6037.
"133 App. Dlv. 756, 118 N. Y. Supp. 136 (1909).1"71 Mont. 105, 227 Pac. 582 (1924).
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holder the right to vote. This is persuasive that the Court
might hold that the first part of the provision grants the right
to vote to every shareholder and that the second part gives him
the right to vote cumulatively."
Although the issue has never been raised in the Montana
Court, it seems quite possible, in the light of the decided cases,
especially those of Illinois, and of the history of this section in
Calfornia, that the Court might decide that the part of See.
5905 set out above is unconstitutional and that Montana cor-
porations cannot issue non-voting stock. This position is
strengthened, first, by the fact that the Montana Court has
continued to assert the "plain meaning" rule of statutory con-
struction, viz., that where the language of the enactment is
clear and construction according to its terms does not lead to
absurd or impractical consequences, the words employed are to
be given their ordinary meaning,' and, second, by the possible
distinction which can be drawn between the Montana and Il-
linois provisions that every shareholder shall have the right to
vote and the Missouri provision that each shareholder shall
have the right to vote. Some authorities have suggested that,
whereas "every" refers to the members of a class as such,
"each" emphasizes the individual."
It is rather hard to tell just what the framers of the Mon-
tana constitution had in mind when they incorporated Art. XV,
Sec. 4, into the constitution. Some light may be thrown on
the problem by the statement made in reference to the com-
parable California section in Del Monte Light and Power Co. v.
Jordan,' "the Constitution of 1879 was adopted at a time in
the history of the state, in fact of all the states, * * * when the
actual or possible evils of favoritism among the stockholders
of corporations, both in respect to voting influence and lia-
bilities, had become apparent * * *. It was to guard against
these and certain other consequences of actual or potential
danger, existing or foreshadowed, * * 0 that the provisions in
Art. XII of our constitution were adopted." If it can be
assumed that, ten years later, the framers of the Montana con-
stitution had the same idea in mind, this would perhaps support
a construction against the power to issue non-voting stock.
Thomas P. Koch.
"Art. XV, Sec. 4, however, may not as a whole have been brought to
the Court's attention.
"R. C. M., 1935, Sec. 10519, 10520. State v. Bruce, 106 Mont. 322, 77
P. (2d) 403 (1938) ; State e.' rel. Du Fresne v. Leslie, 100 Mont. 302,
50 P (2d) 403 (1938).
"People v. Taylor, 257 Ill. 192, 197, 100 N. E. 534 (1912); Griffin v.
Interrurban St. R. Co., 180 N. Y. 538, 72 N. E. 1142 (1905).
"196 Cal. 488, 238 Pac. 710, 713 (1925).
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